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 PRICE COMPETITION IN U.S. BREWING*
 Christian RojAst
 This study utilizes a brand-level dataset that captures a unique natural
 experiment, a 100% increase in the excise tax, to evaluate different
 pricing models in the U.S. beer industry. To assess the plausibility of
 different models, the increase in marginal cost resulting from the tax
 increase is exploited: observed prices in the post-increase period are
 compared to the prices that should be observed under various pricing
 models. Three types of models are analyzed: Bertrand-Nash, leadership,
 and collusion. Results indicate that extreme cases of collusion can be
 confidently ruled out while several models may explain the observed
 prices equally well.
 I. INTRODUCTION
 Economists have devoted considerable effort to the issue of identifying
 firms' pricing conduct when marginal cost data is unobserved. In
 homogeneous product markets, the typical approach is to estimate a
 conduct parameter that can lie in a continuum between competition and
 collusion (Bresnahan [1989]). Identification of conduct parameters in
 markets with many differentiated products, however, is difficult because
 the required product-level data is unlikely to exist (Nevo [1998]).1
 The common approach used to study pricing conduct in differentiated
 products has been to consider a menu of plausible models of pricing conduct
 and rank them according to how well they fit the observed data. Measuring
 the fit of each model takes various forms. One alternative is to estimate
 directly different supply functions, one for each of the competing models,
 and construct pair-wise tests such as non-nested statistics (e.g., Gasmi,
 Laffont and Voung [1992]; Villas-Boas [2007]). This alternative is attractive
 T am indebted to Catherine Eckel for her encouragement, support and constructive comments.
 I thank Everett Peterson for his collaboration in related work and Victor Tremblay for his help
 ful comments. The Editor and two referees provided suggestions that have substantially improved
 this paper. I also thank Ronald Cotterill, Director of the Food Marketing Policy Research Center
 at the University of Connecticut for making IRI and LNA data available. Research and travel
 grants from the Department of Economics at Virginia Tech are acknowledged.
 f Author's affiliation: Department of Resource Economics, 219 Stockbridge Hall,
 University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Massachusetts 01003, U.S.A.
 e-mail: rojas(a resecon.umass.edu
 1 In addition, there has been criticism on the conduct parameter approach at the theoretical
 and empirical level (e.g., Corts [1999]).
 4' 2008 The Author. Journal compilation c 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial
 Economics. Published by Blackwell Publishing, 9600 Garsington Road. Oxford OX4 2DQ. UK, and 350 Main Street. Maiden. MA
 02148, USA.
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 2 christian rojas
 because of the straightforward interpretation of results, but supply needs to
 be modeled directly and it is often difficult to obtain rich enough and reliable
 supply data at the product level. In addition, with a large number of products
 and many competing models, constructing non-nested tests is a non-trivial
 task.
 A second alternative is to use demand estimates to compute the price-cost
 margins implied by the competing models and compare them to observed
 price-cost margins (Nevo [2001]; Slade [2004]). A potential problem of this
 approach is that the crude measures of observed price-cost margins (i.e.,
 average price-cost margins across products) that are available may yield
 unreliable inference.
 This paper employs an alternative approach to evaluate pricing conduct
 by exploiting a unique natural experiment. In 1991, the excise tax on beer in
 the U.S. was doubled, effectively increasing the marginal cost of all domestic
 and imported beers. This study uses a brand-level dataset that captures both
 pre- and post-increase periods. Briefly put, the large increase in marginal
 cost is used to compute the 'predicted' prices that each of the competing
 models would yield when the tax is introduced. Model comparisons are then
 based on metrics that quantify the closeness of each model's predicted prices
 to the 'observed' prices in the post-increase period.
 Previous research has used the excise tax rate to analyze firm conduct in
 the context of a homogeneous product model. Sumner [1981] and Sullivan
 [1985] exploit the state and time variation of the cigarette excise tax to
 identify the degree of competition in the industry. Sumner estimates the
 average pass-through rate of the excise tax and relates it to the average firm
 elasticity and its implied pricing conduct; Sumner concludes that the
 estimated average elasticity is consistent with competitive conduct. Sullivan
 employs a more flexible strategy and reaches a similar conclusion. Data
 limitations do not allow these authors to investigate the issue at the firm or
 product level, which is important because the strategic behavior among
 firms is a key factor in the pass-through rate of excise taxes (Anderson, de
 Palma and Kreider [2001]).
 Studying firm conduct in the U.S. brewing industry is an interesting
 question in its own right. U.S. brewing has experienced a dramatic change
 from a fragmented industry to a highly concentrated oligopoly. The number
 of mass-producing brewers has declined from 350 in 1950 to 24 in 2000 with a
 corresponding increase in the Herfindahl-Hirschman index from 204 to
 3,612 (Tremblay and Tremblay [2005]), making this industry one of the most
 concentrated in the U.S.2
 2 For comparison with other highly concentrated industries, the HHFs for cigarettes,
 breakfast cereals and automobiles are 3,100, 2,446 and 2,506, respectively. The average index
 for all manufacturing industries is 91 (U.S. Census Bureau, [1997] concentration ratios).
 '? 2008 The Author. Journal compilation ?} 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial
 Economics.
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 PRICE COMPETITION IN U.S. BREWING 3
 This rising concentration has often raised concerns about market power
 and non-cooperative behavior (Tremblay and Tremblay [2005]). In
 addition, Greer [1998] and Tremblay and Tremblay [2005], and references
 therein) identify Anheuser-Busch as a price leader especially through its
 heavily marketed brand Budweiser. Evidence supports the fact that by the
 1990's, Anheuser-Busch had become the clear price leader (Tremblay and
 Tremblay [2005]: 171; Greer: 49-51).3
 Earlier studies (Tremblay and Tremblay [1995] and [2005]) have found
 that the degree of market power in U.S. brewing is low; however, their
 analysis is limited to firm-level data. This limitation is particularly relevant
 in the U.S. brewing market where product differentiation is important and
 can give rise to prices above marginal costs even when deviations from
 competitive pricing (Bertrand-Nash) are non-existent.
 Brand-level studies in other industries (e.g., Nevo [2001]; Slade [2004])
 have considered Bertrand-Nash and collusion as the alternative
 modes of competition; this paper entertains two types of leadership
 models in addition to Bertrand-Nash and collusion.4 Both leader
 ship models are intended to reflect and formally test the forms of leadership
 reported in this industry. The first model is called 'collusive price leadership'
 in which followers match Budweiser's price changes. The second model is
 Stackelberg with two variants. In one variant, Budweiser acts as the price
 leader while in the other variant Anheuser-Busch leads other brands with its
 entire product line. As an additional reference, the hypothetical case of
 Bertrand-Nash with single-product firms (which can be thought of as the
 portion of mark-up due to product differentiation alone)5 is compared to the
 other models.
 The dataset is comprised of brand-level prices and quantities collected by
 scanning devices in 58 major metropolitan areas of the United States over a
 period of 20 quarters (1988-1992). The empirical strategy consists of four
 stages. First, a structural demand model for 64 brands is estimated. The
 demand model is based on the neoclassical 'representative consumer'
 approach rather than on the, more popular, 'discrete choice' approach. The
 discrete choice assumption seems appropriate for products like automo
 biles, but it appears less natural for beer. The major challenge of estimating
 3 An anecdotal example that supports this view is the statement by Robert Uihlein,
 Chairman of the Schlitz Brewery: 'A price increase is needed, but it will take Anheuser-Busch to
 do it.' (Fortune [November, 1975, p. 92])
 4 Two exceptions are Kadiyali, Vilcassim and Chintagunta [1996], and Gasmi, Laffont and
 Vuong who consider price leadership as an alternative mode of competition. These applications
 are limited to the Stackelberg model and a small number of products (4 and 2, respectively).
 5 The other portion of mark-ups for multi-product Bertrand-Nash competitors is due to
 concentration (or fewness of multi-product firms) and is equal to the difference between the
 mark-ups given by multi-product and single-product Bertrand-Nash competition (Nevo
 [2001]).
 ? 2008 The Author. Journal compilation ? 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial
 Economics.
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 4 CHRISTIAN rojas
 numerous substitution coefficients is dealt with by the Distance Metric
 (DM) method devised by Pinkse, Slade and Brett [2002]. This paper extends
 previous applications of the DM method (Pinkse and Slade [2004]; Slade
 [2004]) by also estimating advertising substitution patterns.6
 In a second stage, the demand estimates are used to compute the marginal
 costs implied by each of the competing models during the period prior to the
 tax increase. The new marginal costs (pre-increase marginal costs plus the
 tax increase) are then used to find the new equilibrium, or predicted, prices
 that should be observed under each model when the tax is increased. Finally,
 the predicted prices are compared to the actual prices to study which model
 appears to be better supported by the data.
 Results clearly rule out full collusion among all firms and the case
 of collusive price leadership. Some evidence indicates that both Stackelberg
 models may be better predictors of firm behavior. However, the prices
 predicted by Bertrand-Nash, Stackelberg leadership, and collusion among
 selected brands and firms, are not largely dissimilar. A discussion of these
 findings and their relation to previous work is presented in the conclusion.
 II. THE INDUSTRY AND THE TAX INCREASE
 Commercial brewing began during the colonial period. By 1810 there were
 132 breweries producing 185,000 barrels of mainly English and Irish-type
 (ale, porter and stout) malt beverages. Lager beer was introduced in the mid
 nineteenth century and today it accounts for over 90 per cent of the U.S.
 brewing industry's output.7 Overall, total demand for beer in the U.S. has
 been constantly increasing since the mid-twentieth century. Between 1960
 and 1980 strong consumption growth was observed, but for the last three,
 decades demand for beer has remained stagnant (180-210 million barrels per
 year). Per capita consumption has fluctuated but has stabilized at
 approximately 22 gallons per year.
 Currently, the advertising-to-sales ratio for beer is 8.7 per cent compared
 to 2.9 per cent for cigarettes, and 7.1 per cent for other beverages
 (Advertising Age [2000]; cited in Tremblay and Tremblay [2005]). National
 brewers have taken advantage of the more cost-effective marketing channel:
 national TV. Larger national producers have driven many regional
 producers out of business partly because of this marketing disadvantage
 but also because of technological changes that required larger plants to
 achieve a minimum efficient scale (MES).
 6 Incorporating advertising into the demand system helps improve the validity of the price
 instruments (see section V(i)).
 7 A commonly used classification for beers sorts them into lagers and ales. Lagers are brewed
 with yeasts that ferment at the bottom of the fermenting tank. Ales are brewed with yeasts
 fermenting at high temperatures and at the top of the fermenting tank. Porter and Irish are
 darker and sweeter than ale, with minimal market share in the United States today.
 ? 2008 The Author. Journal compilation ?, 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial
 Economics.
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 Figure 1
 Market shares of largest brewers in the U.S.
 Source: Greer (1998), Beer Marketer's Insights.
 Note: Stroh exited the market in 1999. The 2003 number corresponds to Pabst's market share (the
 acquirer of some of Stroh's brands).
 In 2003, nearly 80% of beer sales in the U.S. was concentrated among
 three firms: Anheuser-Busch (49.8%), SABMiller (17.8%) (formerly Miller
 and owned by Philip Morris) and Coors (10.7%). Anheuser-Busch has been
 the largest beer producer since 1960, with an ever increasing market share
 (Figure 1). Budweiser and Bud Light, Anheuser-Busch's two leading brands,
 currently capture approximately one third of beer sales nationwide.
 The industry is characterized by numerous product introductions and,
 consequently, a large number of brands. An interesting fact is the increasing
 popularity of light beer. Since the successful introduction of Miller Lite in
 the 1970's, light beers have become the most popular beer type and now
 account for almost half the sales of beer in the U.S.
 While imports and specialty beers have increased their combined market
 share from less than 1% in the 1970's to approximately 12% and 3%,
 respectively, their impact in the industry as a whole remains limited. The
 reason is that imports and specialty beers tend to compete less directly with
 traditional mass-producers since they target different types of consumers.
 U.S. brewing remains as one of the most interesting industries because of
 its ramifications to other important issues such as health, taxation and
 regulation. Tremblay and Tremblay [2005] present the most comprehensive
 economic analysis of this industry to date.
 The Federal Excise Tax Increase
 In 1990, U.S. Congress approved an increase in the federal excise tax on
 beer from $9 to $18 per barrel. All brewers and importers were required to
 ? 2008 The Author. Journal compilation ? 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial
 Economics.
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 Figure 2
 Quarterly mean prices, various beer segments (1988-1992)
 Source: IRI Database, University of Connecticut
 pay this tax on all produced units as of January, 1991. This increase, which
 was equivalent to an additional 64 cents in federal taxes per 288 ounces (a 24
 pack), represented the largest federal tax hike for beer in U.S. history.
 Figure 2 shows mean quarterly prices (over all cities) for three beer
 segments using the data set available for this paper. There is a clear shift in
 the mean price of all three categories in the first quarter of 1991. All mean
 increases are higher than the actual tax hike of 64 cents per 288 ounces: 220
 cents for imports, 140 cents for super-premium beers and 120 cents for
 budget beers. These mean increases were 237%, 114%, and 84%,
 respectively, larger than the tax increase of 64 cents per case. This is
 consistent with the theoretical findings of Anderson, de Palma and Kreider
 who show that in oligopolies with differentiated products, an excise tax can
 be passed on to consumers by more than 100%.
 III. THE EMPIRICAL MODEL
 Comparison of different pricing models is carried out by exploiting the
 exogenous variation of an increase in the federal excise tax. Since all pricing
 models require estimates of own-price and cross-price elasticities, the first
 step is to estimate the demand for beer at the brand-level. With these
 estimates, the implied marginal costs of all brands are computed for each of
 the models. This computation is carried out in each quarter that preceded the
 tax increase. Using each brand's median marginal cost (over the pre-tax
 increase period), the demand elasticity estimates, the pre-tax-increase values
 of the remaining variables, and the increase in marginal cost due to the tax
 increase, the post-tax increase equilibrium prices are computed for each
 pricing model. These predicted price increases are then compared to the
 ? 2008 The Author. Journal compilation ? 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial
 Economics.
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 PRICE COMPETITION IN U.S. BREWING 7
 actual price increases. This section provides details on demand, supply and
 the computation of marginal costs. Sections V(ii) and V(iii) present details
 on the computation of equilibrium prices and actual prices increases.
 III(i). Demand
 Let v|/ = {1,...,/} be the product set, 3 = {1,..., T} the set of markets (in
 this study a market is defined as a city-quarter pair), qt = {qUi..., qJt] the
 vector of quantities demanded, pt = {pu,.. .,pjt} the corresponding price
 vector and xt = J2jPjtajt total expenditures. The linear approximation to the
 Almost Ideal Demand System (LALIDS) of Deaton and Muellbauer is used
 due its desirable theoretical properties:
 (1) wjt = a* + Y^k bJk l??Pkt + dj \og(xt/Pt)
 where Wjt = /~^L is brand fs sales share and log Pt is a price index
 approximated the loglinear analogue of the Laspeyeres index:8
 (2) log i>,? 5^ logfo,)
 where w? is brand fs 'base' share, defined as w? = T~l J2t Wjt.9
 Traditional advertising (e.g. television, radio and press) is considered the
 key advertising variable because of its crucial role in the development of the
 industry. Further, only the flow effects of advertising are considered with all
 lagged own- and cross-advertising terms being omitted for the demand
 equation.10
 Advertising for brand k (Ak) is incorporated into equation (1) by defining
 the intercept term as: a*t = ajt -f Ylk ci^kv ^e Parameter y is included to
 account for decreasing returns to advertising. Following Gasmi, Laffont
 and Voung, y is set equal to 0.5. Substituting the redefined intercept into
 equation (1) and including an econometric error term gives:
 (3) Wjt = ajt + ]T/c cjkA\t + Y2k bjk logpkt + dj \og(xt/Pt) + ejt
 Equation (3) is as a first-order approximation in prices and advertising to
 a demand function that allows unrestricted price and advertising
 parameters. In order to reduce the number of cross-price and cross
 advertising coefficients that need to be estimated, the Distance Metric (DM)
 method of Pinkse, Slade and Brett is employed. This method specifies each
 8 Moschini [1995] explains how this price index can have superior approximating properties
 than the Stone price index of Deaton and Muellbauer.
 9 The 'fixed' base w? moderates the problem of having an additional endogenous variable
 on the right hand side of (1).
 10 The existence of possible stock effects was investigated but the estimated coefficients on
 lagged advertising expenditures were found not to be statistically different from zero.
 ? 2008 The Author. Journal compilation ? 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial
 Economics.
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 8 CHRISTIAN ROJAS
 cross-coefficient (bjk and cjk) as a function of the distance between brands
 j and k in product space.
 Distance measures may be either continuous or discrete. For example,
 alcohol content can be used to construct a continuous distance measure.
 Dichotomous variables that group brands into different market segments
 are used to construct discrete distance measures and take a value of 1 if
 brands j and k belong to the same grouping and zero otherwise. Continuous
 distance measures use an inverse measure of distance (closeness) between
 brands.
 The terms bjk and cjk are specified as a linear combination of distance
 measures:
 (4) &,* = X>^ r=l
 (5) CJk = J2?sPfk s=\
 where 8Jk = {djk, ..., 8fk] is the set of distance measures for cross-prices and
 pjk = {pjk, ..., pjk} the set of measures for cross-advertising; X and t are the
 coefficients to be estimated.11 After replacing (4) and (5) into (3) and
 regrouping terms gives the empirical demand equation:
 wjt =ajt + bjj \ogpjt + CjjA'jt + Y^=l ( K J2k 5)k lo%Pkt) +
 (6) s ( \
 + 5Z,=i (Ts Ylk VjkAk) + dJ Xo^xtlpt) + ejt
 The estimated coefficients kr and xs and the distance measures between
 brands {5jk and pjk) are replaced into (4) and (5) to obtain cross-terms {bjk
 and Cjk). Since distance measures are symmetric by definition, and to reduce
 the number of parameters to be estimated, symmetry (i.e., bjk = bkj and
 cjk = ckJ) is imposed by setting / and t to be equal across equations.
 In principle, (/?1) seemingly unrelated equations can be estimated.
 However, since J is very large, it becomes impractical to estimate such a large
 system. Alternatively, it is assumed that the own-price and own-advertising
 coefficients (bjj and CjJ), and the price index coefficient (d7), are equal across
 equations thereby reducing estimation to one equation (since symmetry is
 also imposed). Since this is too strong of an assumption, and following
 1 [ Various specifications of the semi-parametric estimator proposed by Pinkse, Slade and
 Brett were implemented to check that the parametric specification of h and g in (4) and (5) is not
 a restrictive functional form. See Rojas [2005].
 ? 2008 The Author. Journal compilation r 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial
 Economics.
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 PRICE COMPETITION IN U.S. BREWING 9
 Pinkse and Slade, the coefficients blh cjh and dj are specified as linear
 functions of brandy's characteristics.
 Because of the large price increase in prices of all beers as a result of the tax
 increase, it is important to allow the budget share allocations xt to change as
 the overall price of beer changes. This can be done by using a two-stage
 budgeting approach, where the bottom level of brand-level demand is given
 by (6) and the top-level demand for beer is modeled as (see Hausman,
 Leonard and Zona [1994]):
 (7) log qt = P0 + Pi log Yt + p2 log II, + Ztqb + e,
 where Yt is income, J\ , is a deflated price index for beer, Zt is a vector of city
 and time- and city-specific dummies, and /} = (j80, P\, Pi) and <j> are vectors of
 parameters to be estimated. The main parameter of interest is p2 because it
 measures the sensitivity of demand for 'all' beer to changes in the overall
 price of beer. Since xt in (6) is a function of (7), unconditional elasticities and
 price derivatives can then be obtained by applying the chain rule to (6).
 Continuous Distance Measures
 The characteristics utilized are alcohol content (ALC), product coverage
 (COV), and container size (SIZE). Product coverage measures the fraction
 of the city in which a brand is present and is defined as the all commodity
 value (ACV) of stores carrying the product divided by the ACV of all stores
 in that city. Beers with low coverage may be interpreted as specialty brands
 that are targeted to a particular segment of the population.12 Beer is sold in a
 variety of sizes (e.g., six and twelve packs), and the variable SIZE measures
 the average 'package size' of a brand. Higher volume brands (e.g., typical
 sales of twelve packs and cases) may compete less strongly with brands that
 are sold in smaller packages (e.g., six packs).
 The characteristics of a brand determine its location in product space.
 Using these locations, inverse measures of distance (closeness) in one- and
 two-dimensional Euclidean spaces are computed for all pairs of brands.13
 Discrete Distance Measures
 Three different types of discrete distance measures are utilized. The first
 type focuses on various product groupings including product segment,
 12 For example, Miller Genuine Draft is in virtually all retail outlets of all cities whereas
 the imported Labatt's Blue is only present, on average, in 45% of a city's supermarkets.
 13 The inverse measure of distance between brands/ and k is defined as: 1/[1 + 2(Euclidean
 distance between j and k)]. Euclidean distance in one-dimensional space is the absolute
 difference in the value of the characteristic between/'and k. In /7-dimensional space, Euclidean
 distance is equal to J2n (/? ? k?)~ < where the subscript is the brand's coordinate in each of
 the n dimensions.
 <; 2008 The Author. Journal compilation < 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial Economics.
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 10 CHRISTIAN ROJAS
 brewer identity, and national brand identity. With no clear consensus on
 product segment classifications, five different classifications are considered:
 (1) budget, light, premium, super-premium, and imports, (2) light and
 regular, (3) budget, light, and premium, (4) domestic and import, and (5)
 budget, premium, super-premium, and imports. Because brand competition
 may be stronger across brands from different brewers, a discrete measure is
 constructed to identify all brands by the same brewer. Similarly, brands that
 are national (regional) may compete more strongly with one another so a
 discrete distance measure that groups brands by whether they are national or
 regional is created.
 Following PSB, two other types of discrete measures are constructed
 based on the nearest neighbor concept and whether products share a
 common boundary in product space. Brands j and k share a common
 boundary if there is a set of consumers that would be indifferent between
 both brands and prefer these two brands over any other brand in product
 space. The nearest neighbor and common boundary measures are computed
 for all pairs brands based on their location in alcohol content and coverage
 space, and coverage and container size space. A second set of nearest
 neighbor and common boundary measures are computed using both
 product characteristics and price thereby allowing consumers' brand choices
 to be influenced not only by distance in characteristics space but also by price
 (see Rojas for details).
 Own-Price and Own-Advertising Interactions
 Two product characteristics are interacted with own-price and own
 advertising in the model:14 the inverse of product coverage (l/COV) and the
 number of common boundary neighbors (NCB). The number of common
 boundary neighbors is a measure of local competition that determines the
 number of competitors that are closely located to a brand in product space.
 NCB is computed in product coverage-container size space and alcohol
 content-coverage space.
 Ill(ii). Supply
 Let Fn be the set of brands produced by firm n. Assuming constant marginal
 costs and linear additivity of advertising, the profit of firm n in a given
 market is expressed as:
 (8) *n = J2 (Pj ~ Cj)qj(p, A)~Y1 AJ jeFn jefn
 14 These were the interactions that yielded the largest explanatory power in several
 specifications.
 ? 2008 The Author. Journal compilation ? 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial
 Economics.
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 where cy is brand fs marginal cost, pj is its price and Aj is firm rts advertising
 expenditures on brand/ Firm rc's first order conditions can be expressed as:
 (9) qj(p,A) + ^(pk-ck)^- = Q, with respect to/?/ keF? ?pJ
 (10) ^(pk-Ck)^-l= 0, with respect to Aj keF? 0AJ
 where |r=s^+ E |^^r- Partial derivatives in (9) and (10) are the m?Fn
 unconditional price derivatives obtained from demand estimates for
 equations (6) and (7). The term &%. in ?& however, takes different values
 depending on the model of interest; this term is the 'conjecture' of firm n
 about how the price of product m will react to a change in the price of
 product j.
 In principle, several games in advertising can also be considered.
 However, simulations of collusion, Bertrand-Nash and Stackelberg games
 in advertising produced equilibrium conditions that were essentially
 indistinguishable from each other; the reason is the small magnitude of
 advertising coefficients obtained from demand estimation. Consequently,
 price is treated as the main strategic variable of interest and it is assumed that
 firms compete in a Bertrand-Nash fashion in advertising.
 Bertrand-Nash and Collusion
 For Bertrand-Nash competition in prices, the conjecture takes a value of
 zero. The conjecture is also zero in the of single-product Bertrand-Nash
 competition and in the case of collusion, but the ownership sets (Fn) are
 modified to reflect the profit-maximizing conditions of single-product firms
 (i.e., F?s are singletons) and colluding firms (i.e. joint profit-maximization),
 respectively.
 Stackelberg Leadership
 Two cases are considered, one in which Budweiser leads brands produced
 by firms other than Anheuser-Busch and the other in which Anheuser-Busch
 leads with its entire product line. For this game, the conjecture term (^pM
 takes a value of zero if j is a follower brand. If j is a leading brand, the
 conjecture term is computed from the first order conditions of followers by
 applying the implicit function theorem. Appendix A contains details of this
 procedure.
 i 2008 The Author. Journal compilation c 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial
 Economics.
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 Collusive Price Leadership
 In this case followers exactly match Budweiser's price changes. In this
 'collusive price leadership' scenario only the first order conditions of the firm
 producing the leading brand (i.e., Anheuser-Busch) are relevant, since
 followers do not price via profit-maximization but by imitating the leader.
 The term ^ in (9) is set to 1 in Budweiser's first order condition and to zero
 in Anheuser-Busch's remaining first order conditions.15
 Ill(iii). Marginal Costs
 In each market, there are two equations for each unknown marginal cost (cj).
 After adding up (9) and (10) for each brandy, a solution for Cj is obtained in
 this new system.16 The system in vector notation is:
 (ii) eo-A(?-c) = o
 where Q? and (p ? c) are J x 1 vectors with elements (gj (p,A)-l) and
 (Pj ? Cj), respectively; A is a J x J matrix with typical element
 AJk = -Ayfrf|^ + ?2JH, where A*k takes a value of 1 if brands j and k are
 produced by same firm and zero otherwise. Applying simple inversion to A in
 (11) gives the implied marginal costs:
 (12) c = p-A-1Q?
 Marginal costs in each market are computed using the demand estimates
 and the appropriate values of the conjectures l-j^j for each of the models.
 Collusive possibilities (e.g., between specific products or firms) are
 investigated by appropriately modifying the elements Al (which determine
 the ownership sets Fn). For example, full collusion, or joint profit
 maximization, is equivalent to setting all At elements to equal one.
 Appendix A provides details on the computation of marginal costs for the
 leadership models.
 IV. DATA
 Table I provides a description and summary statistics of the variable used.
 The main source is the Information Resources Inc. (IRI) Infoscan Database.
 The IRI data includes prices and total sales for several hundred brands for
 15 Appendix A contains details of computational problems (and the solutions adopted) that
 arise in both types of leadership models (Stackelberg and Collusive).
 16 Since this is a linear problem, the solution is unique. Moreover, if cf is the same in both (9)
 and (10) (which it is by assumption) the solution will solve (9) and (10) individually. If, on the
 other hand, two different cfs solve (9) and (10), the solution of the added system will be a linear
 combination of the two cfs.
 c 2008 The Author. Journal compilation ? 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial
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 Table I
 Data Description Summary of Statistics
 Variable Description Units Mean St dev Min Max
 Price Average Price per brand $/288oz 12.1 3.87 0.82 28.9
 Quantity Volume Sold 288 oz 23.53 63.6 0.00 2652
 SIZE Quantity/Units Units = #of units sold, all sizes N/A 0.38 0.117 0.08 1.30
 Coverage Sum of all commodity value (ACV) sold by % 74.0 28.61 0.26 100
 (COV) stores carrying the product/ACV of all stores
 in the city
 OVER50K % of Households with income over % 23.3 6.1 10.3 44.8
 $50,000/year
 A Quarterly national advertising expenditures Mill of $ 3.54 6.3 0 40.37
 ALC Alcohol Content %/vol 4.48 0.94 0.4 5.25
 R 1 if brand is regional, 0 otherwise 0/1 0.15
 WAGES Average wage of worker in retail sector S/hour 7.3 1.17 3.58 12.3
 DEN Population per square mile (000) 4.73 4.13 0.73 23.7
 INCOME Median Income (000) of $ 32.02 6.9 18.1 53.4
 Source: IRI database, University of Connecticut; Bureau of Labor Statistics; Demographia; other sources.
 up to 58 cities over 20 quarters (1988-1992).17 Volume sales (Quantity) in
 each city are reported as the number of 288-ounce units sold each quarter by
 all supermarkets in that city and price is an average price for a volume of 288
 oz. for each brand. To maintain focus on brands with significant market
 share, all brands with a local market share of less than 3% are excluded from
 the sample. This selection criterion provides a sample of 64 brands
 produced by 13 different brewers. Appendix B contains a table of all the
 brands chosen as well as other details of the database and the data selection
 procedure.
 In addition to price and sales data, IRI has information on other
 brand specific and market variables. Because beer is sold in a variety
 of sizes (e.g., six and twelve packs), the variable UNITS provides the
 number of units, regardless of size, sold each quarter. An average
 size variable is created: SIZE = Quantity/UNITS. The variable COV
 measures the degree of city coverage for each brand. Lastly, the
 variable OVER50AT, which is the fraction of households that have an
 income above $50,000 in each city-quarter pair, was also included in the
 estimation.
 Advertising data (A) was obtained from the Leading National Advertis
 ing annual publication. These are quarterly data by brand comprising total
 national advertising expenditures for 10 media types. Alcohol content
 (ALC) was collected from various specialized sources.
 Data for demand side instruments were collected from additional
 sources. A proxy for supermarkets labor cost (WAGES) is constructed
 17 The actual market definitions of these cities are broader than a single city and are usually
 referred to as 'metropolitan areas.' The term city here is used for simplicity. In general, the
 definition of these metropolitan areas is broader than the BLS definitions.
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 from data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics CPS monthly earning
 files. City density estimates (DEN), collected from Demographia and the
 Bureau of Labor Statistics, were included to proxy for cost of shelf
 space. INCOME from the IRI database was used to instrument for
 expenditures (xt).
 V. ESTIMATION
 V(i). Demand and Instruments
 Because firms are assumed to choose both price and advertising, these
 variables are treated as endogenous variables. To avoid simultaneity bias, an
 instrumental variables approach is used to consistently estimate both brand
 level demand (6) and top-level demand (7).
 Brand-level Demand
 Let nz be the number of instruments, Z the (T x J) x nz matrix of
 instruments, S the collection of right hand side variables in equation (6), 6
 the vector of parameters to be estimated and w sales shares in vector form.
 The generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator Ogmm ?
 (S'PzS)~lS'Pzw is employed. The consistent estimator for its asymptotic
 variance is defined as Av2lx(6GMm) = (SfPzS)~\ where Pz = Z(Z'QZ')_1Z
 and Q is a diagonal matrix with diagonal element equal to the squared
 residual obtained from a 'first step' 2SLS regression.
 As in previous work, the instruments employed in this paper rely on the
 identification assumption that, after controlling for brand, city, and time
 specific effects, demand shocks are independent across cities. Because beer is
 produced in large plants and distributed to various states, the prices of a brand
 across different cities share a common marginal cost component, implying
 that prices of a given brand are correlated across markets. If the identifying
 assumption is true, prices will not be correlated with demand shocks in other
 markets and can hence be used as instruments for other markets. In particular,
 the average price of a brand in other cities is used as its instrument.
 The data employed in this study are based on broadly defined markets.
 These broad market definitions, which are similar to those used by the Bureau
 of Labor Statistics, reduce the possibility of potential correlation between the
 unobserved shocks across markets. Furthermore, demand shocks that may be
 correlated across markets because of broad advertising strategies are
 controlled for by including national advertising expenditures in the demand
 equation. To further control of other potential unobserved national shocks,
 time dummies are included in the estimation.
 Because advertising expenditures are only observed at the national level
 each quarter, lagged advertising expenditures are used as its instrument.
 ? 2008 The Author. Journal compilation ? 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial
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 Expenditures (xt), which is constructed with price and quantity variables, is
 also treated as endogenous and is instrumented with median income.
 A final identification assumption, which is common practice in the
 literature, is that product characteristics are assumed to be mean independent
 of the error term. The validity of the proposed instruments is assessed by
 conducting a formal test. Additional instruments for price are created from
 city-specific marginal costs (i.e., proxies for shelf space and transportation
 costs, see Nevo, [2001]) and an overidentifying restrictions test is used to check
 the validity of instruments.
 As observed by Berry [1994], an additional source of endogeneity may be
 present in differentiated products industries. Unobserved product character
 istics (included in the error term), which can be interpreted as product quality,
 style, durability, status, or brand valuation, may be correlated with price and
 advertising and produce biases in the estimated coefficients. This source of
 endogeneity is controlled for with the inclusion of brand-specific fixed effects
 (Nevo [2001]). These fixed effects control for the unobserved product
 characteristics that are invariant across markets, reducing the bias and
 improving the fit of the model.
 Top-level Demand
 Equation (7) is estimated with two-stage least squares where the
 instruments are cost shifters: ingredients, packaging, city density (to proxy
 for shelf space) and labor cost (supermarket and industry).
 V(ii). Predicted Prices with Higher Excise Taxes
 Marginal costs (12) for the pre-tax-increase period are used to compute each
 model's predicted equilibrium prices after the tax change (i.e., the first
 quarter of 1991). Since excise taxes were increased for all beers at a uniform
 rate of E per unit, predicted prices in each city for quarter y + 1 are computed
 by solving for py+ x (j = 1,..., J) in the following system of non-linear
 equations:
 <,(/+', Ay) - 1 + ? (^' - 4 - E) g +1|| = 0, for; k?F? t?Pj 0/ij]
 = 1,..,/
 where the superscript y denotes the quarter prior to the tax increase: fourth
 quarter of 1990.18 Because qj and all derivatives are functions of price (pj+l),
 18 To avoid sensitivity to potential outliers in quarter^, the median city-specific marginal cost
 of brand k over the period 1988-1990 is used for c?. Results, however, are qualitatively the same
 if only marginal costs for the fourth quarter of 1990 are used.
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 the search includes these non-linear terms. Other variables (i.e., advertising,
 distance measures, product characteristics and total expenditures xf) are
 held constant at time y values, while demand parameters are those obtained
 from estimation. The predicted prices are computed for every brand in each
 of the 46 cities for which data are available.19
 Results are invariable to whether pre- or post-tax-increase advertising is
 used in the search. In some cities, a few brands (1 or 2) exited or entered the
 market between the fourth quarter of 1990 and the first quarter of 1991. In
 these cities, the search was performed for the subset of brands that were
 present in both quarters. The potential bias of this simplification is likely to
 be small as the ignored brands tend to be marginal in terms of sales.
 V(iii). Estimates of Actual Price Increases
 A straightforward way to compute an average estimate of the actual price
 increase across cities (and its confidence interval) is to estimate a separate
 regression for each brand of the following form (see Hausman and Leonard
 [2002]):
 (13) pyz = ez + r,'I + eyz
 where pyz is price in quarter y and city z (i.e., each city-quarter pair y,z
 corresponds to a market /), 9Z are city fixed effects, / is a vector of time
 dummy variables (one for each of 19 quarters -one omitted to avoid
 collinearity) and n its corresponding vector of coefficients. If the time
 dummy on the fourth quarter of 1990 is omitted (i.e., this is the reference
 quarter), the coefficient on the dummy for the first quarter of 1991 can be
 interpreted as the absolute mean price increase for that brand due to the tax
 increase (its standard error is used to construct confidence intervals). This
 coefficient, however, captures the mean effect on price of all city-invariant
 factors present in the first quarter of 1991 (i.e., other national shocks besides
 the tax increase). A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 in the first




 This section presents the estimation results for brand-level demand (eq. 6)
 and top-level demand (eq. 7).
 19 This system is solved by using the iterative Newton algorithm for large-scale problems
 provided by Matlab. Convergence is quickly achieved for the Bertrand-Nash and collusive
 models, but leadership models require several hours of computing power.
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 Brand-level Demand
 Because the functional form of demand constitutes only a local
 approximation to any unknown demand function, demand parameters
 can potentially differ between the two regimes (pre- and post-tax-increase).
 However, aside from slightly larger standard errors, demand estimates with
 pre-increase data produced results that were essentially the same as those
 obtained with the full sample. Estimates are therefore robust to these two
 sample sizes. Demand estimates reported in this section were computed with
 the full sample.
 The regressions below contain variables that consistently had the greatest
 explanatory power in different specifications. Table (II) reports the GMM
 regression results for two different models. The difference between models 1
 and 2 is the inclusion of brand dummies. The two models contain time and city
 binary variables (coefficients not reported).
 In the intercept, there is only one product-specific variable that varies by
 market: number of common boundaries in alcohol content-product coverage
 space (NCBAQ. The negative coefficient on NCBAC shows that brands that
 share a common boundary with more neighbors in alcohol content-coverage
 space have a lower sales share.
 The estimated coefficients for own-price, own-advertising, and their
 interactions with product characteristics are reported in the second group
 of variables in Table II. Because price and advertising are highly correlated
 with their corresponding interactions with product coverage, the inverse of
 this latter variable (1 /COV) is used to avoid collinearity. The own-price and
 own-advertising coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 1 %
 level and have the expected negative and positive signs. The negative
 coefficients on the interaction of price and advertising with the inverse of
 product coverage indicates that as the coverage of a brand increases, the own
 price effect for that brand decreases (becomes less negative) while the own
 advertising effect increases (becomes more positive). Thus, the sales of brands
 that are widely sold within a city are less sensitive to a change in price than are
 brands that are less widely available. Also, advertising is more effective for
 brands that are more widely sold. Finally, as the number of common
 boundaries increases, the own-price effect increases (becomes more negative)
 and the own-advertising effect decreases. This shows that higher brand
 competition is associated with more price responsive demand and less
 effective advertising.
 Comparing models 1 and 2, the estimated own-price coefficient is nearly
 twice as large in absolute terms when brand dummies are included.
 Conversely, the own-advertising coefficient decreased by approximately
 80 per cent in model 2. The better goodness-of-fit of model 2 and the
 magnitude of change on both price and advertising coefficients highlight the
 importance of accounting for endogeneity, resulting from unobserved
 ? 2008 The Author. Journal compilation r 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial
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 Table II
 Results of GMM Estimation of Demand Model*
 DEPENDENT VARIABLE: SALES SHARE (w/r) _Model 1 Model 2
 Variable; Description Coeff. (7-stat)** Coeff. (?-stat)**
 Constant ajt
 Brand Dummies no no yes yes
 NCBAC = # common boundary -1.15 (-0.85) -3.91 (-3.66)
 neighbors, Alcohol content - Coverage space
 OVER50K -94.84 (-0.57) -240.0 (-1.90)
 Own Price (b) and Own-Advertising (c)
 "TogP -122.40 (-9.82) - 252.90 (-5.71)
 logP' x (1/COV) -0.56 (-2.38) -1.09 (-3.46)
 logP' x NCBCSP; NCBCSP = # CB neighbors -4.82 (-7.28) -7.14 (-11.35)
 Coverage-Size-Price space
 Ay 8.48 (31.15) 1.32 (4.39)
 A' x (1/COV) -0.68 (-5.58) -0.19 (-3.47)
 A' x NCBCS; NCBCS = #common boundary -1.65 ( ? 3.57) -0.16 (-4.53)
 (CB) neighbors, Coverage-Size space
 Weighted Cross Price and Weighted Cross-Advertising Terms (A/ and xm)
 Distance Measures for Price
 Alcohol Content - Product Coverage, 2.10 (13.66) 5.32 (11.00)
 two-dimensional product space
 Nearest neighbors in Alcohol Content - Product -0.21 (-0.30) 8.87 (15.62)
 Coverage space
 Brewer identity -12.18 (-5.38) 17.30 (5.31)
 Product classification 2: Regular - light 52.39 (6.62) 93.56 (3.99)
 National Identity 40.83 (5.85) 49.61 (5.39)
 Distance Measures for Advertising
 Container Size, one-dimensional product space 0.17 (7.83) 0.16 (8.64)
 Common boundary in product coverage - 0.85 (15.50) 0.71 (15.23)
 container size - price space
 Nearest neighbors in product coverage - container 0.61 (14.70) 0.40 (12.24)
 size space
 Product Classification 3: Budget, light, and premium - 2.78 (- 14.58) - 3.22 (- 9.10)
 National Identity -3.02 (-21.79) 5.30 (2.65)
 Price Index (d)
 \og(xt/Pf) 2815 (T08) 2735 (138)
 R2 (centered, uncentered) 0.40,0.58 0.66,0.76
 /-Statistic (p-value) 0.90 0.50
 *Note: Based on 33,892 observations. Coefficients in table are original coefficients x 104. All specifications
 include, time and city dummies (not reported).
 **Asymptotic /-statistics.
 product characteristics, with the inclusion of brand dummies. Furthermore,
 the overidentification test in model 2 (p-value = 0.50) suggests that the choice
 of instruments is valid.
 In model 2, the estimated coefficients on the weighted cross-price terms are
 all positive. Thus, brands that are closer in the alcohol content-product
 coverage space (both in terms of Euclidean distance and nearest neighbor),
 ? 2008 The Author. Journal compilation ? 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial
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 produced by the same brewer, belong to the same product segment, or have
 similar geographic coverage, are stronger substitutes than other brands.
 Intuitively, consumers will more likely switch to a brand located nearby in
 product space and/or produced by the same brewer than to more distant
 brands. Based on the magnitude of the estimated coefficients, the strongest
 substitution effects are for brands in the same product segment and with
 similar geographic coverage.
 With the exception of product segment, the estimated coefficients on
 weighted cross-advertising terms are positive. This suggests the existence of
 cooperative effects across brands that are more closely located in product
 space and with the same geographic coverage. However, the negative
 coefficient for product segment indicates that there are predatory advertising
 effects for brands in the same product segment, thereby potentially offsetting
 some of the cooperative effects.
 The estimated coefficient on real expenditures, \og(xt/Pt), is not statistically
 different from zero. Several attempts to interact product or market
 characteristics with real expenditures yielded statistically insignificant
 coefficients. This result implies that the brand-level budget elasticities are
 not statistically different from one.
 Top-level Demand
 Various sets of instrumental variables and specifications failed to produce
 statistically significant estimates of the overall price elasticity of beer, p2 in
 equation (7). This is a somewhat unlikely result, as prior research has
 typically found a statistically significant price elasticity for beer. Evidence of
 this are the troublesome unconditional (brand-level) price elasticities
 obtained with this estimate of p2: it is not uncommon to see own-price
 elasticities that are less than one in absolute value, which typically imply
 (unfeasible) price-cost margins of over 100%.
 Hausman, Leonard and Zona suggest that the use of longer time series can
 produce more plausible estimates of the overall price elasticity of beer. The
 data used in this study appear to be contemporaneous to that of Hausman,
 Leonard and Zona, who use 16 years of data and instrumental variables
 (similar to those proposed here) to estimate an overall price elasticity for
 beer of ?1.36 (s.e.: 0.21). This is the estimate employed to compute
 unconditional elasticities and price derivatives.
 Elasticities
 Unconditional elasticities were computed in each city-quarter pair using
 the estimates of ((6), model 2 above) and (7). All own-price elasticities are
 ? 2008 The Author. Journal compilation ? 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial Economics.
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 negative and statistically significant, with a median of - 3.34.20 Cross-price
 elasticities have a median value of 0.050 with 92% of them being positive;
 none of the negative cross-price elasticities is significant while 96% of the
 positive cross-price elasticities is significant. In general, median own-price
 elasticities are slightly smaller to those reported in Hausman, Leonard and
 Zona (? 4.98), and Slade (? 4.1). Cross-price elasticities are similar to those
 in Slade but an order of magnitude smaller than those reported by Hausman,
 Leonard and Zona. A reason for the larger cross-price elasticities in
 Hausman, Leonard and Zona is that a significantly smaller number of
 brands are considered in their study; the magnitude of cross-price elasticities
 needs to decrease as more brands are added, otherwise the elasticity matrix
 would cease to be dominant diagonal.
 Median own-advertising elasticity is 0.024 with approximately 85% of
 them being positive. Cross-advertising elasticities have median of 0.021 with
 88% of them being positive. However, not all advertising elasticities are
 significant: 15% of all negative advertising elasticities and 14% of all
 positive elasticities are not statistically significant. A sample of median price
 and advertising elasticities and a further discussion are provided in Rojas
 and Peterson [2008].
 VI(ii). Implied Price-Cost Margins
 For each model, implied marginal costs in the pre-tax-increase period are
 calculated according to details in section Ill(iii). Summary statistics of marginal
 costs can be informative about differences in the equilibrium predictions of
 the models; however, price-cost margins are more readily interpretable. Pre
 tax-increase summary statistics of price-cost margins (PCM) as a percentage
 of price (100 x [p - c]/p) are presented in Table III. Seven different models
 are considered: Bertrand-Nash; two Stackelberg scenarios: firm leadership
 by Anheuser-Busch and brand leadership by Budweiser; collusive leadership
 by Budweiser; and three collusive scenarios: collusion of the three leading
 firms (Anheuser-Busch, Coors and Miller), collusion of the leading regular
 brand produced by each of the three largest firms (Budweiser, Coors and
 Miller Genuine Draft), and full collusion. In addition, the hypothetical case
 of single-product Bertrand-Nash competition is also considered.
 The mean PCMs in the two Stackelberg cases and in collusion among
 three brands are very similar to that of Bertrand-Nash. Collusion among
 three firms has slightly larger PCMs than Bertrand-Nash, and full collusion
 has the largest PCMs (although there are several cases in which unfeasible
 price-cost margins (over 100%) are detected). The PCMs under single
 20 Signficance is determined with 95% confidence intervals (not shown), which were
 computed using 5,000 draws from the asymptotic distribution of the estimated demand
 coefficients.
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 Table III
 Summary Statistics of Price Cost Margins for Different Models, (1988--1990)*
 Model Mean Median St dev
 Single-Product Bertrand-Nash 34.63 31.06 25.18
 Bertrand-Nash 37.26 35.48 23.73
 Anheuser-Busch Stackelberg Leadership 37.47 35.85 23.79
 Budweiser Stackelberg Leadership 37.27 35.48 23.74
 Collusive Leadership (Budweiser)** 55.03 52.79 23.83 Collusion 3 firms? 39.53 41.77 23.23
 Collusion 3 brands ? 37.20 35.72 23.44
 Full Collusion 68.01 69.78 11.64
 *Margins are denned as 100 x (p ? c)/p. Based on 18,369 (brand-city-quarter) observations in the pre-increase
 period (1988-1990).
 **Price-cost margins obtained for Anheuser-Busch brands only.
 ?Anheuser-Busch, Adolph Coors and Miller.
 ? Budweiser, Coors, Miller Genuine Draft.
 product Bertrand-Nash are lower but close to multi-product Bertrand
 Nash. This suggests that a large portion of the mark-up implied by
 multi-product Bertrand-Nash competition can be explained by product
 differentiation alone, while only a small remainder can be explained by
 concentration of brand ownership.
 Since in the collusive price leadership scenario, PCMs are only computed
 for Anheuser-Busch brands, summary statistics for this case are not directly
 comparable with those of other models. However, PCMs are significantly
 larger for Budweiser (mean 97% vs. 78% in Bertrand-Nash, not shown) and
 similar to Bertrand-Nash PCMs for other Anheuser-Busch brands (mean
 47% in both collusive price leadership and Bertrand-Nash, not shown).
 In all models, PCMs vary considerably across brands. This heterogeneity
 is directly related to the price elasticities and the strategic behavior of firms
 and thus is plays an important role when comparing each model's predictive
 power.
 One way to identifiy models of competition is to compare implied PCMs
 with observed PCMs. However, observed PCMs are unavailable. A raw
 measure of PCM is the gross margin (total shipments minus labor and
 materials) calculated from the Annual Survey of Manufacturers (as in Nevo
 [2001]). The average gross margin for the U.S. brewing industry in the pre
 tax increase period (1988-1990) is 44.53% (27.5% for all food industries),
 which is somewhat larger than what is predicted by the models, except for
 collusive leadership and full collusion. The next section provides brand-level
 closeness measures between the observed prices and the prices predicted by
 the different models during the post-tax-increase period.
 Vl(iii). Predicted vs. Actual Price Increases
 Here absolute price increases h^+1 - Pj) are compared to estimates of
 observed or 'actual' price increases (see sections V(ii) and V(iii)). A graphical
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 Rudweis T -?? Predicted Increase ($) -?-Actual Increase ($)*
 Anheuser-Busch Coors Bond Corp Pabst Miller Stroh
 I 3 5 7 10 12 14 16 18 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 47 49 51 53 56 58 60 62
 Brand ID**
 Figure 3
 Predicted price increases by Bertrand-Nash behavior vs. actual price increases per brand after
 100% hike in the federal excise tax (mean over 46 cities)
 * Vertical Lines are 95% Confidence Intervals
 **See Table V for Brand ID's
 assessment of each brand's mean predicted price increase across cities
 revealed that full collusion and collusive price leadership produce unlikely
 high price increases (10 times or more the amount of the actual price
 increase) whereas the remaining models (including single-product Bertrand
 Nash) yield predicted increases that are not substantially different from each
 other. For this reason, and because of space constraints, only predicted
 increases of Bertrand-Nash (the baseline case) are presented graphically for
 each brand. Figure 3 plots the means of the price increases as predicted by
 Bertrand-Nash as well as the means of the actual price increases. Mean
 predicted increases are averages across 46 cities while mean actual increases
 are computed according to details in section V(iii). 95% confidence intervals
 are displayed for the mean of actual price increases.21
 There are several patterns in Figure 3. Price increases tend to be under
 predicted (44 out of 63 brands).22 Also, over-predicted prices appear to be
 more frequent among the two largest beer producers: Anheuser-Busch (7 out
 of 10) and Miller (4 out of 7). This is because these two firms produce the
 21 The non-linear systems for predicted price increases require several hours of computing
 time. Calculating confidence intervals for predicted mean price increases with a bootstrapping
 technique are hence extremely costly even with a modest number of draws.
 22 A similar number of under-predictions are detected for the other models not shown in the
 figure (except for full collusion and collusive price leadership in which all price increases are
 over-predicted).
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 Table IV
 Summary Statistics of Actual and Predicted Price Increases, and
 Performance Metrics of Models
 Summary Statistics3 Performance Metrics
 Mean Median St. Dev. # No-Rejectb Weighted Increase0 SSDd
 Actual Increases 1.38 1.37 0.65 N/A 64.74 N/A
 Predicted Increases
 Single-Product Bertrand-Nash 0.95 0.81 1.07 20 89.74 3587
 Bertrand-Nash 1.02 0.90 1.02 21 86.91 3643
 A-B Stackelberg Leader6 1.00 0.92 0.98 21 76.80 3441
 Budweiser Stackelberg Leader 0.99 0.89 0.99 21 78.97 3442 Collusion 3 firmsf 1.21 1.11 1.01 22 87.48 4328
 Collusion 3 brands8 1.03 0.93 1.00 23 84.45 3621
 Full Collusion 18.19 13.40 15.88 0 1014.95 > 1E6
 "Computed with absolute price increases for each brand: the absolute price difference between the first quarter
 of 1991 and the fourth quarter of 1990, over 46 cities (1748 observations).
 bN umber of brands for which mean of predicted increases falls within the confidence intervals of mean of actual
 increases (as in Figure 3).
 cSum of weighted absolute price increases; weight = volume of brand sold in city total volume of all brands in all
 cities in the first quarter of 1990 (1748 observations).
 dSum of squared deviations over all brands and all cities; deviation = predicted-actual (1748 obs.).
 eA-B = Anheuser-Busch.
 fAnheuser-Busch. Adolph Coors, Miller (Philip Morris).
 gBudweiser, Coors, Miller Genuine Draft.
 more price-inelastic brands and price elasticity is inversely associated with
 higher tax pass-through rates. Many brands have tight 95% confidence
 intervals around actual mean increases (around 15 0 and 200), indicating
 that price increases do not vary substantially across cities. This pattern can
 particularly be observed for brewers that tend to produce nationally:
 Anheuser-Busch, Coors, Pabst, Miller and Stroh.
 Since graphical assessment is not very informative about the relative
 predictive power of the models, summary statistics and performance metrics
 are analyzed next. The left part of Table IV presents summary statistics of
 price increases (i.e., the absolute difference in prices between the two
 quarters).23 Except for full collusion, the mean and median of predicted
 increases are similar across models and smaller than those of actual price
 increases; this is a consequence of most prices being under-predicted. The
 closeness in statistics between single-product Bertrand-Nash and multi
 product Bertrand-Nash is consistent with the observation in section VI(ii)
 that a large portion of mark-ups may be explained by product differentiation
 alone, and a small portion by brand ownership concentration.
 23 Collusive price leadership is omitted from the table because convergence in the search for
 the predicted prices was not always achieved. When convergence was achieved, price increases
 were unlikely high. The lack of convergence is interpreted as further support for the improbable
 nature of this model.
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 The summary statistics of Table IV would suggest that collusion among
 3 firms appears to be a better predictor of actual price increases. However,
 closer graphical inspection (discussed below) indicates that this is due to
 larger over-predictions for Anheuser-Busch's and Miller brands rather than
 by smaller under-predictions of other brands. Larger standard deviations of
 predicted increases with respect to standard deviations of actual price
 increases indicates less variability in actual price increases. The full collusion
 model can confidently be rejected given its unlikely predicted increases.
 The right part of Table IV presents three performance metrics. The first
 metric (# Non-Rejections) is the number of brands for which predicted mean
 price increases fall within the confidence intervals of actual mean price
 increases shown in Figure 3. According to this metric, collusion among 3
 brands explains firm conduct more precisely than the other models.
 Two more rigorous metrics are considered. The first is the sum of weighted
 price increases, where the weight is given by each brand's market share.
 With this metric, accuracy in prediction is more important for more
 widely sold brands. Interestingly, with this criterion Stackelberg leadership
 by Anheuser-Busch, closely followed by Stackelberg leadership by
 Budweiser, outperforms other models. The second metric is the sum of
 squared deviations, where a deviation is defined as the difference between the
 predicted increase and the actual increase.24 This criterion confirms that the
 two Stackelberg models may be better predictors of actual conduct.
 To further understand why the last two metrics indicate a superior
 performance by Stackelberg leadership models, the differences between
 predicted increases and actual increases for a selected group of brands and
 models are analyzed. Figure 4 reports such differences for three models:
 Bertrand-Nash, Stackelberg leadership by Anheuser-Busch and 3-firm
 collusion. Stackelberg leadership by Budweiser and 3-brand collusion are
 not included because they can not be distinguished visually from Anheuser
 Busch Stackelberg leadership (A-B leads) and Bertrand-Nash (B-N),
 respectively.25 The selected brands are those for which the notable
 differences across models were observed; these brands belong to the three
 largest firms (A-B, Coors, Miller).
 Proximity to zero in Figure 4 denotes greater accuracy; a positive number
 denotes over-prediction and a negative one under-prediction. Compared
 with Bertrand-Nash, it can be seen that A-B Stackelberg is more accurate for
 several A-B brands (both over-predicted and under-predicted), especially
 Budweiser, the most popular brand in the U.S. The 3-firm collusion case
 almost always predicts larger price increases than Bertrand-Nash and hence it
 only represents an improvement to Bertrand-Nash in under-prediction cases.
 24 The same conclusion is reached if each deviation is weighted.
 25 Single-product Bertrand-Nash is also excluded because of its closeness to multi-product
 Bertrand-Nash.
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 Brand ID*
 Figure 4
 (Predicted price increase)?(actual price increases), after 100% hike in the Federal excise tax
 (mean over 46 cities)
 *SeeTable B.I for Brand ID's
 VII. CONCLUSION
 The study combines a rich brand-level data set, recent demand estimation
 techniques and a unique natural experiment (a large increase in excise tax) to
 evaluate alternative models of firms' pricing conduct in the U.S. brewing
 industry. The strategy is to focus on the period when the tax increase became
 effective, January of 1991, and compare the observed prices with those
 predicted by different models of price competition.
 Bertrand-Nash, and several variants of leadership and collusion are
 considered as possible pricing models. There are two cases of Stackelberg
 leadership, one where the largest firm, Anheuser-Busch, leads with its entire
 product line and another where it leads with its flagship brand Budweiser.
 Collusive scenarios consider the three largest firms, the three leading regular
 brands of beer and collusion among all brands. A case of collusive
 leadership is also considered, where all brands match Budweiser's price
 increases.
 Several metrics of closeness between predicted price increases and
 observed price increases indicate that collusion among all brands and
 collusive price leadership can be confidently rejected as plausible models of
 firm conduct. Among the remaining models, both Stackelberg leadership
 variants appear to be slightly better predictors of firm behavior. However,
 this evidence is interpreted with caution as competing models' predicted
 increases are not largely dissimilar and it is likely that the better fit might not
 be statistically significant to warrant such a conclusion. The results are
 somewhat in line to those of Nevo [2001] and Slade [2004], who reject full
 ? 2008 The Author. Journal compilation ? 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial
 Economics.
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 collusion in favor of Bertrand-Nash. Results also indicate that single
 product Bertrand-Nash predicts price increases that are similar to those of
 multi-product Bertrand-Nash, which suggests that mark-ups are mostly
 driven by product differentiation while brand ownership concentration
 appears to have a small role.
 One possibility that emerges from this study is the existence of
 observational equivalence between several models of competition.
 The reason for this may be that in a complex environment with many
 strategic interactions, it is more difficult to achieve straightforward
 comparative static results than in the textbook duopoly case, where, for
 example, Stackelberg's equilibrium price is substantially larger than
 Bertrand-Nash's.
 As in previous work, the inference conducted in this paper depends
 crucially on the precision of demand estimates. The distance metric method
 employed here is effective in reducing the number of cross-price and cross
 price effects, but it relies heavily in the researcher's ability to have data on all
 product characteristics that effectively determine substitution effects.
 Results may change if there are important unobserved product character
 istics.
 There are several advantages and disadvantages to the approach used in
 this paper. Since the effective change in marginal cost for all beer producers
 is known, the comparison between models may be potentially more reliable
 than contrasting crude measures of observed price-cost margins with the
 implied price-cost margins. An additional advantage is the relative
 simplicity with which comparisons across models can be made. However,
 the approach employed here can not be generalized because
 natural experiments are not always present. Another potential drawback
 is that clear statistical comparisons, as in non-nested tests, may not be
 feasible.
 There are several issues that this study does not address. First, because of
 the time aggregation of data (quarterly), it is not possible to study in more
 detail firms' price adjustment decisions which would prove useful in
 determining Anheuser-Buschs leadership and in analyzing the stock effects
 of advertising. The analysis here takes the form of a one-shot game. A
 dynamic environment, however, is important when future profits are not
 independent of the current state thereby making the static solution
 suboptimal. For example, it is likely that more successful firms like
 Anheuser-Busch have a longer horizon in mind (and hence a potentially
 different price than the static solution) than firms that are under financial
 stress like Stroh, Heilman and Pabst. Finally, detailed cost data at the
 manufacturer and retailer level can allow to extend the analysis to vertical
 aspects and also more rigorous econometric tests of the competing pricing
 models considered in this paper.
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 APPENDIX A: SUPPLY DETAILS
 Derivation of^f dpj
 Define a partition of the product set as v|/ = (v|//, \|//), where \|//is the set of follower brands
 and \|// is the set of leading brands, with /Fand JL number of elements respectively. For
 each leader, a system of equations is constructed. Each Ith system of equations is used to
 compute the vector of all ^ terms for leader /. An equation in system / is obtained by
 totally differentiating the price first order condition of all follower brands (9)26 with
 respect to all followers' prices (/?/, for all/e \|//) and the price of the Ith leader, /?/ (1 e \|//):
 .fev, [dPf k V, V dpjdpfj ' ' d/>,J
 (14) ' ^ " '
 where Al takes the value of one if brandsy and k are produced by the same firm and zero
 otherwise. Therefore, for a given leader /, there are JF equations like (14). Let G be the
 (JF x JF) matrix that contains all g elements above and define the (JF x 1) vectors Ds
 and Hi as:
 - dPx i r -h(\,o ~
 Ds= '. ;Hi =
 .dpjF\ [-h(JFJ)_
 For a given/?/, (14) is written in matrix notation as:
 GDS - Hidpi = 0
 where d/?/is treated as a scalar for matrix operations. The JF derivatives of the followers'
 prices with respect to a given pt are computed as:
 (15) ^ = G~XHi dpi
 Concatenating the (?/ - JF) vectors of dimension (JF x 1) given in (15) (one vector for each
 pi) gives D = GlH. The JF x JL matrix D has a typical element ^-, for/expand /e\|//.
 26 It is assumed that the first order condition with respect to advertising (10) does not play a
 role in deriving^. Without this assumption, inversion of matrix G below is not possible since it
 is not a square matrix. Results are unlikely to be sensitive to this assumption given the estimated
 small impact advertising has on demand.
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 Marginal Costs in Leadership Models
 Stackelberg Model
 While marginal costs are obtained by applying (12), the derivative ^ needs to be
 computed first via equation (15). Several technical difficulties arise in this model. First,
 there is a large number of possible Stackelberg scenarios. Given the motivation in this
 paper, only the case in which Anheuser-Busch acts as a leader, both with all its brands
 as well as with Budweiser, are considered.
 Second, since the term $f in the leaders' first order conditions is a function of "Pj
 followers' marginal costs (see equation (15)), these marginal costs are computed first.
 When Anheuser-Busch acts as a leader with all its brands, followers' marginal costs can
 be obtained by inversion of a smaller system of dimension JF in (12). These marginal
 costs are used to compute %S which is afterwards used to calculate the marginal costs of
 the leading brands.
 When Budweiser is a sole brand leader, the term %*- is set to zero if m is produced by
 Anheuser-Busch, except for the brand Budweiser. Also, it is assumed that Budweiser
 only leads brands produced by rival firms (i.e., not by Anheuser-Busch).
 Collusive Price Leadership Model
 In this case, only Anheuser-Busch's marginal costs can be derived since first order
 conditions of other firms are not relevant (see section IH(ii)). These marginal costs are
 also recovered by applying (12) to a system of dimension JL (where JL is the number of
 brands sold by Anheuser-Busch) and by setting ^ to 1 in Budweiser's first order
 condition and zero in the remaining first order conditions.
 APPENDIX B: DATA DETAILS
 IRI is a Chicago based marketing firm that collects scanner data from a large sample of
 supermarkets that is drawn from a universe of stores with annual sales of more than 2
 million dollars. This universe accounts for 82% of all grocery sales in the U.S. In most
 cities, the sample of supermarkets covers more than 20% of the relevant population. In
 addition, IRI data correlates well with private sources in the Brewing Industry (the
 correlation coefficient of market shares for the top 10 brands between data from IRI
 and data from the Modern Brewery Age Blue Book is 0.95). Brands that had at least a
 3% local market share in any given city were selected. After selecting brands according
 to this criterion, remaining observations are dropped if they had a local market share of
 less than 0.025%. Brands that appear in less than 10 quarters are also dropped. Also, if
 a brand appears only in one city in a given quarter, the observation for that quarter is
 not included either. This is done because some variables in other cities are used as
 instruments. On average there are 37 brands sold in each city market with a minimum of
 24 brands and a maximum of 48 brands. Table B.I contains a list of the brands used with
 information on country of origin and the corresponding brewers.
 The original data set contained observations in 63 cities; five cities were dropped
 because of minimal number of brands or quantities. Overall, the number of cities
 increases over time; however, some cities appear only in a few quarters in the middle of
 ? 2008 The Author. Journal compilation ? 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial
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 Table B.I
 Selected Brands by Brewer (Acronym and Country of Origin)
 Brewer Brand Brewer Brand
 Anheuser-Busch: Budweiser Grupo Modelo: Corona
 (AB, U.S.) Bud Dry (GM, Mexico)
 Bud Light Goya (GO, U.S.): Goya
 Busch Heineken: Heineken
 Busch Light (H, Netherlands)
 Michelob Labatt: Labatt
 Michelob Dry (LB, Canada) Labatt Blue
 Michelob Golden Draft Rolling Rock
 Michelob Light Molson: Molson
 Natural Light (M, Canada) Molson Golden
 Odoufs Old Vienna
 Adolph Coors: Coors Pabst: Falstaff
 (ADC, U.S.) Coors Extra Gold (P, U.S.) Hamms
 Coors Light Hamms Light
 Keystone Olympia
 Keystone Light Pabst Blue Ribbon
 Bond Corpa: Black Label Red White & Blue
 (B, U.S.) Blatz Miller/Phillip Morris: Genuine Draft
 Heidelberg (PM, U.S.) Meister Brau
 Henry Weinhard Ale Meister Brau Light
 Henry Weinhard P. R. MGD Light
 Kingsbury Miller High Life
 Lone Star Miller Lite
 Lone Star Light Milwaukee's Best
 Old Style Stroh: Goebel
 Old Style Light (S, U.S.) Old Milwaukee




 White Stag Stroh
 Genesee: Genesee FX Matts: Matts
 (GE, U.S.) Kochs (W, U.S.) Utica Club
 aThese brands correspond to G. Hieleman Brewing Co., which was acquired in 1987 by Australian Bond
 Corporation Holdings; it is classified as a domestic brewer because this foreign ownership was temporary.
 the period. The average number of cities per quarter is 47. Brands are identified as
 regional or national as follows. First the percentage of cities in which each brand was
 present was averaged over time. Brands with an average percentage close to 100 are
 denoted national and brands with a percentage of (roughly) 50% or less are denoted
 regional. The variable WAGES was constructed by averaging the hourly wages of
 interviewed individuals from the Bureau of Labor Statistics CPS monthly earning files
 at the NBER. For a given city-quarter combination, individuals working in the retail
 sector were selected for that city over the corresponding three months. The average was
 then calculated over the number of individuals selected.
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